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In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a
citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can
lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That
is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only
one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An “extremist“ candidate is
elected and implements a “centrist“ policy that differs from the one most
preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones
obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are
exogenous.
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1. Introduction
There is a long and glorious tradition in political economy that builds on the as-
sumption that the main objective of politicians is to win an election (Downs 1957).
Within this framework, known as the \downsian" paradigm, when competing for elec-
tion political candidates shape their policy platforms to please the (policy-concerned)
electorate so as to maximize their probability of winning. In other words, a building
block of the downsian paradigm is that the preferences of political candidates dier
from the preferences of the citizens, or equivalently, the (pre-specied) set of political
candidates is not a subset of the citizenry.
Over the last twenty years, several authors have challenged this view by proposing
alternative models of electoral competition where politicians are assumed to be not
only oce-motivated, but also policy-motivated (Alesina 1988, Hibbs 1977, Wittman
1977). Within this framework, known as the \partisan" paradigm, when competing
for election, political candidates choose their policy platforms by trading-o their
policy concerns with their desire to win the election. As in the downsian framework,
however, the set of political candidates is exogenously specied.
Recently, Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) have pro-
posed an alternative approach to the study of political competition known as the
\citizen-candidate" paradigm. This framework removes the articial distinction be-
tween citizens and candidates that is prevalent in the other approaches. This is ac-
complished by assuming that politicians are selected by the people from those citizens
who choose to become candidates in an election. Once in oce, elected candidates
implement their most preferred policies.
While ultimately implemented by elected representatives, policy-making is typi-
cally the outcome of a political process that also involves non elected political actors.
In particular, lobbying is an important part of the policy-making process in repre-
sentative democracies. This raises the question: To what extent does lobbying aect
policy?
Several authors have analyzed this issue in the context of models of electoral com-Endogenous Lobbying 2
petition where lobbies (or interest groups) are primitives of the model.1 In particular,
Besley and Coate (1999) consider a citizen-candidate model where exogenously given
lobby groups compete to inuence policy-makers by oering transfers conditional on
policy. The main result of their analysis is that lobbying need have little or no eect
on equilibrium policy outcomes.
In this paper, we extend the citizen-candidate framework to endogenize the num-
ber and characteristics of lobbies. Our main result is that lobbying always matters.
That is, lobbying always aects equilibrium policy outcomes.
Like in Besley and Coate (1997), we model the political process as a multi-stage
game that begins with the citizens' decisions to participate in the political process as
candidates for public oce. Given the set of candidates, all citizens have the right to
vote in an election that selects a single representative to choose policy for one period.
When casting their ballot, citizens are assumed to be strategic.2
We depart from this framework by assuming that after the electoral outcome
is announced, citizens decide whether to participate in the policy-making process
as lobbyists. Lobbies try to inuence the policy choice of the elected candidate
by oering him transfers in exchange for policy compromise. Contrary to most of
the existing literature, we do not model lobbying as a \menu-auction" (Bernheim
and Whinston 1986, Besley and Coate 1999, Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997,
Grossman and Helpman 1994, Grossman and Helpman 1996, Persson and Helpman
1998). Rather, we assume that given the set of lobbyists who enter the political
process after an election, the elected candidate chooses the coalition of lobbyists he
will bargain with over policy (in exchange for transfers). Thus, policy is the outcome
of ecient bargaining between the elected policy-maker and a coalition of lobbyists
selected by the policy-maker.3
1This literature originates from the work by Tullock (1967) on rent-seeking. For a partial account
of the large literature on lobbying see, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1999).
2This assumption dierentiates the citizen-candidate model of Besley and Coate (1997) from the
one of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) where citizens are assumed to vote sincerely.
3Diermeier and Merlo (1999) use a similar framework to analyze the process of government
formation in parliamentary democracies.Endogenous Lobbying 3
We nd this framework appealing for at least two reasons. First, the main objec-
tive of the citizen-candidate approach is to endogenize the participation decisions of
the actors involved in the political process. Thus, endogenizing the individual decision
of entering politics as a lobbyist is a natural step forward within this approach. Sec-
ond, casual observations suggest that while a number of lobby groups may be willing
to oer favors to elected politicians in exchange for policy compromise, policy-makers
have a choice as to whom to include in their bargaining coalition.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, as stated above, lobbying
always inuences policy. In other words, in any equilibrium of the endogenous lobby-
ing game, the elected candidate never implements the policy outcome that would be
implemented in the absence of lobbying (that is, the policy most preferred by some
elected candidate). Policy is always the outcome of a compromise between the pol-
icy preferences of the elected candidate and those of the lobbyists who are included
in the bargaining coalition. (Notice that the bargaining coalition is never empty in
equilibrium).
This result is in contrast to one of the results obtained by Besley and Coate
(1999) in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous. In
their paper, the presence of (pre-specied) lobbies in the political process need have
little or no eect on equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, they show that it is
possible to construct examples where the equilibrium set of policy outcomes of the
game with lobbying is identical to the equilibrium set of the game without lobbying.
The reason for the result is that voters can restrict the inuence of lobbyists via
strategic delegation by supporting candidates with osetting policy preferences. In
other words, in the game where lobbies are allowed to inuence policy, voters can
strategically elect a candidate who (after lobbying takes place) implements exactly the
same policy that a dierent candidate would implement in the game where lobbying
is ruled out.
In our model, the choice to become lobbyists is endogenous. This gives citizens
an additional instrument to inuence policy besides the electoral process. In particu-
lar, citizens can control the inuence of lobbying directly, without the need to resortEndogenous Lobbying 4
to strategic delegation. Lobbying takes the form of ecient bargaining between the
elected candidate and a coalition of lobbyists of his choice. In equilibrium, not all
lobbies operate for any elected candidate, and not all possible policies can be im-
plemented. In particular, the equilibrium policy diers from the one that would be
selected in the absence of lobbying.4
Second, endogenizing the number and characteristics of lobbies reduces the multi-
plicity of equilibria inherent in citizen-candidate models with strategic voting (Besley
and Coate 1997). This multiplicity persists when lobbies are exogenously introduced
into the analysis (Besley and Coate 1999). In our setting, only one policy outcome
emerges in equilibrium. An \extremist" candidate is always elected, but the equilib-
rium policy is never extreme. In fact, policy is biased toward the center, even though
in general it is not equal to the policy most preferred by the \median voter".
2. The Model
Each citizen i 2 f1;:::;Ng has quasi-linear preferences over a one-dimensional policy
outcome x 2 X = [0;1] that has a public good nature and distributive benets
yi 2 R that have a private good nature. Citizens dier with respect to their policy
preferences. For simplicity we restrict attention to the case where there are three
types of citizens j, j 2 fL;C;Rg, indexed by their most preferred policy outcome zj,
j = L;C;R, and we assume that zL = 0, zC = a 2 (0;0:5), and zR = 1. We further
assume that the number of citizens of type j, Nj, is large and such that Nj < N=2,
j = L;C;R.5
The utility function of a citizen of type j, j = L;C;R, is given by
Ui(x;yi;j) = u(x;j) + yi (1)
4In the context of a downsian model of political competition which embeds a menu-auction model
of (exogenous) lobbies Grossman and Helpman (1996) also obtain that lobbying always inuences
policy. Our result may be interpreted as a way to provide a micro-foundation for reduced form
\policy compromise" functions like, for example, the one used by Grossman and Helpman (1996).
5Like in Besley and Coate (1997) there is no incomplete information in our model. In particular,
the type of each citizen is publicly observable.Endogenous Lobbying 5
where u(x;j) is strictly concave, single-peaked at zj and symmetric. For ease of
exposition | in order to obtain closed-form solutions to the model | in what follows
we take:6
u(x;j) =  (x   z
j)
2: (2)
We normalize aggregate transfers to be zero (i.e.,
P
iN yi = 0). Also, we assume
that any policy x 2 X is costless to implement.
As discussed in the Introduction our model modies the framework of Besley and
Coate (1997) by endogenizing the number and characteristics of lobbies.
We assume that the political process has four stages. In the rst stage, all citizens
choose whether to run for oce. Given the set of candidates that have entered the
electoral competition an election follows in the second stage. The election selects one
candidate that is delegated the policy decision for one period. In the third stage,
all non-elected citizens decide whether to become lobbyists and whether to subsidize
lobbying activity. In the fourth and nal stage, lobbying takes place and policy is
chosen. We describe below the structure of each stage of the political process.
2.1. Entry of Candidates
Each citizen must decide simultaneously and independently whether or not to run
for oce. If a citizen enters the electoral competition as a candidate he has to pay a
small monetary cost  > 0. The decision yields benets to the citizens either directly
from winning or indirectly by aecting the identity of the winner.
Let s
j
i 2 f0;1g denote the decision by citizen i (of type j 2 fL;C;Rg) whether
to become a candidate: s
j
i = 1 indicates citizen i's decision to enter the electoral
competition.7
6While the details of the derivation presented in the paper clearly depend on the quadratic form of
the function u(;), all of our results hold true for any strictly concave, single-peaked and symmetric
function.
7In principle, we could allow candidates to randomize on their entry decision as in Besley and
Coate (1997). However, as it will be clear below, in our setting allowing for mixed strategies does not
expand the equilibrium set. In particular, the entry game has a whole set of pure strategy equilibria
where the type and the policy choice (but not the identity) of the elected candidate are uniquelyEndogenous Lobbying 6
In principle, it is possible that more than one citizen of the same type decide to
run for oce.8 If this is the case, unlike in the standard citizen-candidate model, we
assume that there exists a mechanism that selects only one of these citizens. In other
words, at most one citizen of each type can be a candidate in a general election. For
concreteness we label this selection mechanism \primaries".9 We model primaries as
an equal probability lottery over the set Sj of all type j citizens who decide to run
for oce: Sj = fi j s
j
i = 1g. We denote j 2 f0;1g, j 2 fL;C;Rg, the variable that
indicates whether the set Sj is non-empty: j = 1 if Sj 6= ; and j = 0 if Sj = ;.
Thus,  = (L;C;R) is the outcome of the entry-of-candidates subgame.
In Appendix B below, we characterize the set of equilibria of our political compe-
tition model in the absence of primaries. It is then possible to construct pathological
equilibria that are based on the fact that the polity of a given type may split its
votes among identical candidates in any possible way provided that each voter is not
pivotal: that is, he cannot aect the electoral outcome by unilaterally switching his
vote from one candidate to an identical one. Clearly the role of the primaries is to
prevent these equilibria from arising.
We view this selection mechanism as a reasonable one on the ground that these
equilibria are only based on the assumption that there exist multiple identical can-
didates of the same type. Clearly this assumption is not realistic. In particular, any
uncertainty on the dening features of all the candidates of a given type will break
the voters' indierence. Consider a model in which this uncertainty takes the form
of a small amount of noise that aects the way in which the polity perceives each
candidate. The mechanism through which a candidate of a given type is selected
by the polity when the amount of noise converges to zero behaves like the primaries
described above.
determined.
8In fact, since, as in Besley and Coate (1999), lobbying creates rents to holding oce, competition
among a number of candidates with the same policy preferences will be the norm.
9Notice that in our model there are no political parties. The term primaries is only used here to
describe a mechanism that selects one of possibly many identical candidates. For a citizen-candidate
model with political parties see Riviere (1999).Endogenous Lobbying 7
For any given , let C() represent the set of candidates with typical element ej,
j = fL;C;Rg.
Finally, we assume that if no citizen runs for oce a default policy x0 2 [0;1] is
implemented.
2.2. Voting
Elections are structured so that all citizens have one vote that, if used, must be cast
for one of the candidates.
In particular, given a set of candidates C(), each citizen simultaneously and
independently decides to vote for any candidate in C() or abstains. Let vi denote
citizen i's choice: if vi = j then citizen i casts a vote for candidate ej 2 C(); while
if vi = 0 he abstains. A vector of voting decisions is denoted by v = (v1;:::;vN).
The candidate who receives the most votes is elected, and in the event of ties, the
winning candidate is chosen with equal probability from among the tying candidates.
We denote P E(v) 2 C(), E 2 fL;C;Rg, the elected candidate.
We assume that citizens correctly anticipate the outcome of the lobbying stage
that follows an election and vote strategically: each citizen i chooses his vote vi so as
to maximize his expected utility given the voting decision of every other citizen v i.
2.3. Entry of Lobbyists
For each type j, j = L;C;R, let lj denote a potential lobby of type j.10 After the
election, all non-elected citizens of type j play a \subscription game" (Bagnoli and
Lipman 1989) in which they pledge funds to lobby lj. After all subscriptions are made,
all non-elected citizens decide whether to become lobbyists. That is, each non-elected
citizen must decide whether to become a member of the lobby of his type.11
10Without loss of generality we treat all potential lobbies of the same type as one lobby.
11The assumptions that citizens can only pledge funds to and enter the lobby of their type are
made here to clarify lobbying activity.Endogenous Lobbying 8
Given the elected candidate P E, the subscription game is structured as follows.
Each citizen of type j simultaneously and independently decides whether to pledge a
xed amount t
j
PE to lobby lj, as dened in (6) below. Denote T
j
PE the total amount
of subscriptions made to lobby lj. These subscriptions are contingent on at least one
citizen entering lobby lj. If no citizen of type j becomes a lobbyist, the funds pledged
to lobby lj are returned to the pledging citizens.12
Given T
j
PE, j = L;C;R, each non-elected citizen simultaneously and indepen-
dently decides whether to become a lobbyist. If a citizen chooses to become a lobbyist
he has to pay a small monetary cost  > 0. Each lobbyist of type j appropriates an
equal share of the subscriptions T
j
PE made to lobby lj.
Denote i 2 f0;1g the decision of citizen i (of type j 2 fL;C;Rg) whether to
enter lobby lj, and  = (1;:::;N) the vector of entry decisions by all citizens.13
We take LE() to be the set of lobbies that are active when the elected candidate is
P E and the vector of entry decisions is . These are the lobbies that have at least
one member.14
2.4. Lobbying
Each active lobby is assumed to be able to sign binding contracts on policy choices
with the elected candidate P E in exchange for transfers. These transfers are nanced
in equal share by the members of the lobby. Notice that the elected candidate P E
has the option of not signing any contract and implement his most preferred policy
zE.15
12Unlike Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) we exogenously x the magnitude of the pledges in the
subscription game. This simplies the computation of each citizen's payo.







14For simplicity, we restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria of the entry-of-lobbyists sub-
game. As discussed below, while allowing citizens to randomize on their entry decision expands the
equilibrium set, the qualitative features of our results remain valid.
15If the elected candidate chooses this option, then the model coincides with the original model
of Besley and Coate (1997) where lobbying is not allowed.Endogenous Lobbying 9
Let E denote the power set of LE(). We interpret this set as the collec-
tion of all possible coalitions of lobbies with whom the elected candidate P E may
choose to bargain over policy and transfers. For example, if a citizen P L of type
L is elected and LL() = flC;lRg then the set of possible bargaining coalitions is
L = ff;g;flCg;flRg;flC;lRgg.
We model lobbying as a two stage bargaining game. In the rst stage, each
possible coalition ` 2 E is associated with a willingness to pay, W`(x;zE), for any








where wj(x;zE) is the willingness to pay of lobby lj measured in units of the private
good and W;(x;zE)  0.
To determine the willingness to pay of a lobby, we take a noncooperative approach
and allow the members of the lobby to free-ride on each other's willingness to pay for
policy x. Given the public good nature of x, this approach implies that the amount a
group of identical citizens (the members of each lobby) is willing to pay for any given
policy is bounded above by the willingness to pay of a representative citizen of that
group.16 Based on these considerations, we take the willingness to pay of lobby lj for
any policy x 2 X to be the willingness to pay of a representative individual of type
j.
In the second stage of the bargaining game, the elected candidate P E rst chooses





16This outcome would obtain if we were to explicitly model the way a lobby aggregates the
preferences of its members through a voluntary contribution game. See, for example, Laont (1988).Endogenous Lobbying 10
and then chooses a bargaining coalition `PE:




Hence, an outcome of the bargaining game between the elected candidate P E and a
selected coalition `PE is a policy choice xPE(`PE) and transfers W`PE(xPE(`PE);zE).
Implicit in the statement of problems (4) and (5) is the assumption that the elected
candidate appropriates the entire willingness to pay of the selected bargaining coali-
tion. This is equivalent to assuming that at the lobbying stage the elected candidate
has all the bargaining power.17
To complete the description of the lobbying subgame, we need to specify the size
of the amounts t
j






This assumption implies that, if all citizens of a given type j subscribe to lobby lj
and lobby lj pays transfers to the elected candidate, then the only additional cost a
lobbyist in lj pays (over and above what every other citizen of his type pays) is the
entry cost . As it will become clear in Section 3 below, this argument guarantees
that every lobby that, if active, would be included in the bargaining coalition by the
elected candidate, is indeed active in equilibrium. Using Bagnoli and Lipman (1989),
the critical size of t
j
PE that would guarantee this result and is such that in the unique
equilibrium of the subscription game all citizens choose to pledge, is lower than the
one in (6) above. However, unlike (6), these critical values of t
j
PE for all types and all
elected candidates depend in a rather cumbersome way on the set of lobbies that are
active in each case. Hence, to simplify our analysis, we take t
j
PE to be equal to (6) and
17This assumption is not crucial for our results. The equilibrium characterization of the entry-of-
lobbyists subgame as well as of the lobbying subgame remain the same if the gains from trade are
shared between the elected candidate and the members of the coalition in any xed proportion. As
claried below, in this case we would need to modify the amounts citizens can pledge to a lobby in
the subscription game, that are dened in (6) below.Endogenous Lobbying 11
impose the additional assumption that in the event that not all type-j citizens choose
to pledge t
j





We proceed backward to solve for the subgame perfect equilibria of the four-stage
political game described in Section 2 above. We start from the last stage of the game:
lobbying.
3.1. Equilibria of the Lobbying Subgame
Let P E be the candidate elected in the voting subgame and LE() the set of active
lobbies determined in the entry-of-lobbyists subgame.
We rst compute the willingness to pay of each lobby for any policy choice x by
the elected candidate. For any elected candidate P E and any LE(), the willingness
to pay of an active lobby lj 2 LE() for any policy x 2 X the elected candidate P E
may choose to implement instead of his most preferred policy zE is:
wj(x;z
E) = u(x;j)   u(z
E;j) (7)
This is the dierence in utility with respect to the status quo that a citizen of
type j obtains if the elected candidate P E's policy choice is x. The status quo is here
dened to be P E's policy choice in the absence of any lobbying, zE.
A direct implication of (7) is that for any policy x 2 [0;1], the willingness to pay
of a lobby of the same type E of the elected candidate is such that:
wE(x;z
E)  0: (8)
From denition (3) and equation (7) we can obtain the total willingness to pay ofEndogenous Lobbying 12










We can now provide a characterization of the elected candidate P E's coalition
choice. First notice that the elected candidate will never choose any coalition that
contains a lobby of his own type. Indeed, from (8), such a lobby has a negative
willingness to pay for any policy choice x 6= zE. Therefore, the elected candidate is
strictly better o by excluding from policy negotiations a lobby of his own type.
Lemma 1. For any elected candidate P E, if lE 2 LE(), then lE 62 `PE.
Proof: The result follows from (7) and (8).
Without loss of generality, we therefore assume lE 62 LE().
Second, notice that for any coalition ` 2 E the equilibrium policy choice that
the lobbying process generates is uniquely determined.18
Lemma 2. For any elected candidate P E, any LE(), and any coalition ` 2 E,













Proof: From (2) the objective function in (4) is strictly concave. The rst order






j) = 0: (11)
18This result is similar to the one obtained by Diermeier and Merlo (1999) in the context of
government coalition bargaining.Endogenous Lobbying 13
Then the unique solution of equation (11) is (10).
For any possible coalition `, the outcome of the bargaining is a compromise be-
tween the policy most preferred by the elected candidate and the policy preferences
of the lobbyists in the bargaining coalition. Given the quadratic specication of pref-
erences we adopt, this policy compromise takes the form of a simple average of the
most preferred policies of the parties involved in the negotiation.
We can now complete our characterization of the lobbying stage of the model by






Lemma 3. For any elected candidate P E and any LE(), the solution to problem
(5) is:
Case I: If LE() = f;g, then `PE = f;g;
Case II: If LE() = f;;ljg, j 6= E, then `PE = fljg;
Case III: If LE() = f;;li;ljg, i;j 6= E, then:
(i) If E = L then depending on the value of the parameter a we distinguish two
cases:
(i 0) If a   a then `PL = flRg.
(i 00) If instead a   a then `PL = flC;lRg.
(ii) If E = C then `PC = flRg.
(iii) If E = R then `PR = flL;lCg.
The proof of Lemma 3 is presented in Appendix A. It follows from this lemma that
if only one lobby is active then this lobby is always included in the bargaining coalition
by every elected candidate. If two lobbies are active, then the elected candidateEndogenous Lobbying 14
chooses the bargaining coalition ` that maximizes the total surplus from implementing
policy xPE(`).
We have now all the elements to present our rst result. This result summarizes
the outcome of the lobbying subgame for any possible elected candidate P E and any
possible set of active lobbies LE().
Proposition 1. For any elected candidate P E and any LE(), the optimal policy
and coalition choices xPE and `PE are:
If LE() = f;g, then: `PE = f;g and xPE = zE for E 2 fL;C;Rg.






If LE() = f;;li;ljg, i;j 6= E, then:
 If E = L and LL() = f;;lC;lRg we distinguish two sub-cases:
{ If a   a then: `PL = flRg and xPL = 1
2.
{ If instead a   a then: `PL = flC;lRg and xPL = 1
3 (1 + a).
 If E = C and LC() = f;;lL;lRg then: `PC = flRg and xPC = 1
2 (1 + a).
 If E = R and LR() = f;;lL;lCg then: `PR = flL;lCg and xPR = 1
3 (1 + a).
Proof: The proof follows directly from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
The characterization of the equilibrium of the lobbying subgame (Proposition 1)
implies that the elected candidate P E receives transfers W`PE(xPE;zE) from coalition
`PE.
We can now move to the analysis of the entry-of-lobbyists stage of the model.Endogenous Lobbying 15
3.2. Equilibria of the Entry-of-Lobbyists Subgame
The key feature of this subgame is the fact that a lobbyist provides a public service to
the citizens of his type. A citizen who decides to become a lobbyist pays the entry cost
 and may inuence the elected candidate's policy choice in a way that is benecial to
all the citizens of his type by paying the elected candidate transfers. Therefore, when
deciding whether to become a lobbyist, a citizen may have an incentive to free-ride
on the activity of other lobbyists of his own type.
The subscription game described in Section 2.3 above allows citizens to subsidize
the activities of the lobby of their type. Given our assumptions, the total amount of
subscriptions made to lobby lj is either equal to the transfers lobby lj is willing to pay
to the elected candidate P E, T
j
PE = u(xPE;j)   u(zE;j), or equal to zero, T
j
PE = 0.
The following proposition characterizes the pure strategy equilibria of the entry-
of-lobbyists subgame.19




PE) and of entry decisions  induce the following set of active lobbies
LE():
If E = L there are two cases to consider:
{ If a   a then: LL() = flRg.
{ If instead a   a then: LL() = flC;lRg.
If E = C then: LC() = flRg.
If E = R then: LR() = flL;lCg.
Furthermore, each active lobby contains exactly one lobbyist.
19Of course, if no candidate is elected, the default policy x0 is implemented and no lobby is active
in equilibrium.Endogenous Lobbying 16
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix A. Several observations are in
order. First, the only lobbies that are active in equilibrium are the ones that inuence
policy. In other words, lobbies that would not be included in the bargaining coalition
by the elected candidate do not operate. Second, the pure strategy equilibrium of the
entry-of-lobbyists subgame characterized in Proposition 2 is unique up to the identity
of the lobbyist in each active lobby. Third, this equilibrium solves the free-rider
problem associated with citizens' participation in lobbying activities.20
It follows from our results that lobbies always inuence the policy choice of any
elected candidate.
Corollary 1. Any elected candidate will never choose to implement his most pre-
ferred policy.
Proof: The result follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
Another implication of our ndings is that the policy most preferred by the median
voter, that is policy a, would never be implemented.
Corollary 2. Any elected candidate will never choose to implement the policy most
preferred by the median voter.
Proof: The result follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium of the entry-of-lobbyists sub-
game, the following corollary determines the total amounts of subscriptions lobbies
receive in equilibrium.
Corollary 3. For any elected candidate P E, in the equilibrium of the entry-of-
lobbyists subgame, all lobbies lj 62 `PE, j 2 fL;C;Rg, receive subscriptions T
j
PE = 0.
20The entry-of-lobbyists subgame has also a mixed strategy equilibrium where there exists a
positive probability that no citizen of any type will ever become a lobbyist. This is clearly a
byproduct of the free-rider problem discussed above. While this free-rider problem may be of interest
in itself, we nd the properties of the pure strategy equilibrium more appealing.Endogenous Lobbying 17
If E = L and  a  a  0:25, lobby lC 2 `PL receives subscriptions T C
PL = 0, while
lobby lR 2 `PL receives T R
PL = u(xPL;R)   u(zL;R).




The proof of Corollary 3 is presented in Appendix A. It follows from this result that
only lobbies that are included in the bargaining coalition by the elected candidate may
receive positive subscriptions. In general, citizens need to pledge positive amounts
to the lobby of their type to induce the entry of at least a lobbyist. There exists
however a case where no subscriptions are made to an active lobby that aects the
policy outcome. This happens when the costs to a citizen of moving the equilibrium
policy closer to his ideal point by becoming a lobbyist are small compared to the costs
of accepting the policy that would otherwise emerge if he chooses not to become a
lobbyist.
3.3. Equilibria of the Voting Subgame
We have now all the elements to characterize the equilibria of the voting subgame.
Recall from Propositions 1 and 2 that if elected, a candidate of type j 2 fL;C;Rg
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We can then derive each citizen's payo if a candidate of type j 2 fL;C;Rg were
to be elected.21 First, consider a citizen of type L. His payos for all possible electoral
21These are the payos of a type j citizen who chooses not to be a lobbyist. The payos of a type
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Using equations (14), (15), and (16), we can now rank all potential electoralEndogenous Lobbying 19
outcomes according to the preferences of each citizen of type j 2 fL;C;Rg.22
First consider the case where a   a. In this case, we have that
P R L P L L P C
P R C P L C P C
P C R P L R P R
(17)
where j denotes the strict preference relation of a citizen of type j over potential
winners of the electoral competition.23
Notice that when citizens of type C are relatively close to citizens of type L with
respect to their policy preferences (a   a), no citizen ever ranks a potential outcome
where a candidate of his own type is elected at the top of his preference ordering. The
intuition for this result follows from the fact that any elected candidate will always
include in his bargaining coalition the lobby that is as far as possible from his most
preferred policy. As illustrated in Proposition 1, this occurs because such a lobby
has the highest willingness to pay for policy compromise. Therefore, the equilibrium
policy choice that is closest to the most preferred policy of a type j citizen is never
implemented by a type j candidate.
Consider now the case where a   a. In this case, the preference orderings of
all citizens over potential winners of the electoral competition can be described as
follows.
P L L P R L P C
P L C P R C P C
P C R P R R P L
(18)
Notice that when citizens of type C are suciently dierent from citizens of type
L with respect to their policy preferences (a   a), type L citizens rank the electoral
22These preference orderings are derived under the maintained assumption that Nj, j 2 fL;C;Rg,
is large.
23The same preference orderings hold for citizens who will decide to become lobbyists. This is so
because, by assumption, the entry cost  is small relative to the dierences in utilities induced by
the policy choices of potential winning candidates.Endogenous Lobbying 20
outcome where a type L candidate is the winner at the top of their preference ordering.
The reason why the intuition provided above does not hold in this case is that two
potential winners (namely P L and P R) would now implement the same equilibrium
policy, if elected. This is the mean of the most preferred policies of all citizens and
the most preferred equilibrium policy by type L citizens. Thus, the only dierence
between the two potential outcomes is the amount of transfers necessary to induce
each winner to adopt such a policy. For a type L citizen the potential winner P L is
cheaper.24
A striking implication of the preference orderings in (17) and (18) is that there
always exists an electoral outcome that is preferred by a majority of citizens to any
other outcome. In particular, given three potential outcomes P L, P C, and P R, there
always exists a Condorcet winner. If a   a, then the Condorcet winner is P R. If
instead a   a, then the Condorcet winner is P L.
We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium of the voting subgame.
Proposition 3. For any vector of candidate entry decisions  that induces a set of
candidates C() there exists a unique electoral outcome.
Suppose a   a.
If C() = fejg then P E = ej.
If eR 2 C() then P E = eR.
If C() = feL;eCg then P E = eL.
Alternatively, suppose a   a.
If C() = fejg then P E = ej.
24Citizens who will decide to become lobbyists may have dierent preference relations between
the two potential winners PL and PR who would implement the same policy because of the entry
cost . However, this problem aects at most six citizens. Since N is large, we ignore this issue
when characterizing the equilibrium of the voting subgame.Endogenous Lobbying 21
If eL 2 C() then P E = eL.
If C() = feC;eRg then P E = eR.
Proof: The result is a direct implication of the preference orderings in (17) and
(18).
We can now complete our characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium of
our model of political competition.
3.4. Equilibria of the Entry-of-Candidates Subgame
We start by proving a property of the citizens' decision whether to run for oce.
Lemma 4. All equilibria of the entry-of-candidates subgame are such that:
If a   a then eR 2 C().
If instead a   a then eL 2 C().
Proof: Consider the case where a   a. Assume by way of contradiction that
eR 62 C(). It follows from the preference orderings in (17) that by entering, a citizen
of type R would be elected for sure. In this case, his payo would be equal to
u(xPR(`PR);R) + W`PR(xPR(`PR);z




which, for a small cost of entry , is positive. Notice that by not entering, the
citizen's payo would be negative regardless of the electoral outcome (see equations
(16)). Thus, a citizen of type R would enter. This is a contradiction of the assumption
eR 62 C().
The proof in the case a   a is analogous and therefore omitted.
Lemma 4 implies that for any location a of the policy most preferred by the median
citizen-type C an extremist candidate | that is, either a type-L or a type-R citizen
| always enters the electoral competition.Endogenous Lobbying 22
We have now all the elements to state and prove the main result of our paper.
Proposition 4. All equilibria of the political competition game are such that:





(1 + a): (20)





(1 + a): (21)
Proof: Let a   a. By Lemma 4, eR 2 C(). By Proposition 3, eR 2 C() implies
that P E = eR. Thus, no candidate eh, h 6= R, wants to enter the electoral competition
since he cannot aect the outcome of the election and hence the policy outcome by
running for oce. Furthermore by not entering candidate eh saves the entry cost .
Once again the analysis of the case a   a is analogous to the one presented above
and therefore omitted.
We discuss the implications of Proposition 4 in detail in Section 4 below.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium of our electoral competition
model we still need to analyze each citizen's decision whether to enter the pool of
identical citizens among which the primaries select a unique candidate. Since the
electoral outcome is uniquely determined, it follows from Proposition 4 above that
citizens of a type dierent from the one that will win the election have no incentive
to enter the electoral competition. At the same time, citizens of the type that will
indeed win the election have an incentive to compete for oce. The entry decision
entails a cost . Hence, identical citizens enter the primaries so as to compete away
all the rents from running for oce.25
25This result parallels the one on rent dissipation in Besley and Coate (1999). However, general-
izing their analysis of the welfare cost of lobbying in representative democracies to a setting where
lobbies are endogenous is beyond the scope of this paper.Endogenous Lobbying 23
Let  nR















Notice that for  small enough we have  nR
 > 1 and  nL
 > 1.
The following corollary identies the type and number of citizens who compete in
the primaries.26
Corollary 4. If a   a then  nR
 citizens of type R pay the cost  and enter the set
SR among which eR 2 C() is selected.
If instead a   a then  nL
 citizens of type L pay the cost  and enter the set SL among
which eL 2 C() is selected.
Proof: Let a   a. Assume that (m   1) type R citizens have decided to enter the






















From denition (22), if m   nR
 and  is small then in  out. There exists then
a whole set of pure strategy equilibria in which exactly  nR
 type R citizens enter the
electoral competition and are selected to run for oce with probability (1= nR
 ). The
identity of these potential candidates is, of course, indeterminate.
26For simplicity we restrict attention to the pure strategies equilibria of this entry game.Endogenous Lobbying 24
The proof in the case a   a is analogous and therefore omitted.
4. Discussion
To analyze the full set of implications of our model we begin by characterizing the set
of equilibria of the benchmark model where lobbying is not allowed. This analysis is
based on Besley and Coate (1997). For purpose of comparison, however, we assume
the existence of primaries as in the model we described in Section 2 above. Moreover,
we consider the case where the number of citizens of each type is the same, that is
Nj = N=3 = n, j = L;C;R.
When lobbying is not allowed there exist only two types of equilibria of the elec-
toral competition model. These are one-candidate or three-candidate equilibria.27
The one-candidate equilibria are such that a single citizen of the median type C
runs unopposed and implements policy a. These equilibria parallel the median voter
theorem for direct democracy.
The three-candidate equilibria are such that a citizen of each type runs for oce.
Each one of the three candidates is elected with equal probability. If elected, candidate
ej, j 2 fL;C;Rg, implements policy zj. These equilibria have an \egalitarian" avor
in the sense that the most preferred policy of each type of citizen has an equal
probability of being implemented.
We can now comment on the implications of our analysis.
Remark 1. Lobbying always matters.
The equilibrium policy outcome in the game with endogenous lobbies is not an
equilibrium outcome in the game without lobbying. Notice that this result is in
contrast with the one obtained by Besley and Coate (1999) in the context of a citizen-
candidate model where lobbies are exogenously given. In particular Besley and Coate
show that it is possible to construct equilibria of such a model where the policy choices
27Our assumptions on the preferences of type L, C and R citizens imply that two-candidate
equilibria do not exist.Endogenous Lobbying 25
coincide with the ones that would emerge in the equilibria of the citizen-candidate
model without lobbying. The equilibria of the two models are, however, dierent
with respect to the identity of the elected candidate who implements such policies.
In particular, in the model with exogenous lobbies citizens neutralize the inuence of
lobbies over policy by strategically electing a candidate with osetting preferences.
The features of their model that are critical to obtain this result are the freedom to
choose the number, the size, and the location of the lobbies. While these features
are available in a model in which lobbies are treated as primitives, in our model the
number and characteristics of lobbies are endogenous.
To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Let a = 0:2 and suppose
there exists only one lobby consisting of 4 citizens of type L. Following Besley and
Coate (1999), the policy choice implemented by any elected candidate maximizes the
combined surplus of the elected policy maker and the members of the lobby group.
Hence, if the elected candidate is of type L, he implements policy xPL = 0. If
instead the elected candidate is of type C, he implements policy xPC = a2 = 0:04.
Finally, if the elected candidate is of type R, he implements policy xPR = a = 0:2.
The one-candidate equilibria of this game with one exogenous lobby are such that a
single citizen of type R runs unopposed and implements policy a. This is the same
equilibrium policy outcome that would obtain in the absence of lobbying. However,
the identity of the strategically elected candidate who implements such policy diers.
Remark 2. Lobbying reduces the set of equilibria of the citizen-candidate model of
electoral competition.
Endogenizing the number and characteristics of lobbies increases the predictive
ability of the citizen-candidate framework. As illustrated by Besley and Coate (1997),
citizen-candidate models with strategic voting typically have a large number of equi-
libria. This multiplicity persists when exogenous lobbies are introduced into the
analysis (Besley and Coate 1999).
Remark 3. The equilibrium policy is always biased toward the center of the policy
space.Endogenous Lobbying 26
Notice that in all equilibria of our game one \extremist" candidate runs unop-
posed. However, the equilibrium policy is never extreme. In fact, regardless of his
type, any elected candidate implements the same equilibrium policy. Such a policy is
centrally located in the policy space, even though it is not equal to the policy most
preferred by the median citizen-type C.
Remark 4. The equilibrium policy outcome is robust to changes in the electoral
rule.
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) show that in a citizen-candidate framework with sin-
cere voting the equilibrium predictions of the model are dierent under plurality rule
and majority rule with a runo. In our model, the equilibrium policy outcome is the
same under either electoral rule. Also, our analysis implies that the characterization
of the equilibrium policy choice above holds for any \Condorcet consistent" voting
rule.28
In this paper, we have restricted attention to the simple case where there are only
three types of citizens. While increasing the number of types signicantly complicates
the analysis, we conjecture that our main result (lobbying always matters) would
generalize for any nite number of types.
28A voting rule is Condorcet consistent if it always selects a Condorcet winner whenever a Con-
dorcet winner exists.Endogenous Lobbying 27
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider Case I rst. In this case no lobby is active, hence LE() = f;g
and PE has no alternative but to choose his most preferred policy choice zE. In this case the policy
choice coincides with the one in Besley and Coate (1997).
Consider now Case II. If PE chooses not to get involved in any lobbying then his utility function
is u(zE;E) = 0. Assume now that PE chooses ` = fljg. From (10) it follows that PE's optimal
policy choice is xP E(`) = 1
2 (zE + zj). Therefore the elected candidate's utility is
u(xP E(`);E) + u(xP E(`);j)   u(zE;j) =
1
2
(zE   zj)2 > 0 (A.1)
It follows from (A.1) that PE chooses ` = fljg.
Consider now Case III. We start from the rst sub-case (i): E = L and LL() = f;;lC;lRg.
Using (10) we obtain that PL's utility if ` = f;g is
u(0;L) = 0: (A.2)































































Comparing (A.3) with (A.2) and (A.4), given that a < 0:5 we conclude that ` = flRg dominates
both ` = f;g and ` = flCg. Therefore the relevant comparison is the one between the choice of
coalition ` = flRg and the choice of coalition ` = flC;lRg. Comparing (A.3) and (A.5) we conclude
that if a   a, where  a is dened in (12) above, then the optimal coalition choice is ` = flRg, if
instead a   a then the optimal coalition choice is ` = flC;lRg.
The remaining two sub-cases (ii) and (iii) can be analyzed in an analogous way. Details are
therefore omitted.Endogenous Lobbying 28
Lemma A.1. For any elected candidate PE, and any vector of entry choices  i, if T
j
P E = 0 the
best reply of citizen i of type j 2 fL;C;Rg in the entry-of-lobbyists subgame satises the following
four properties:
1) A citizen of type j never enters a lobby lj such that, if he decides not to enter, lj 2 LE().
2) A citizen of type j never enters a lobby lj 62 `P E.
3) A citizen of type j never enters a lobby lj such that, if he decides to enter, LE() = fljg.
4) A citizen of type j does not enter a lobby lj such that, if he decides not to enter, lj 62 LE() and
if he decides to enter, lj 2 `P E except for the following two cases:
 if E = L a citizen of type C enters lobby lC if  a  a  1
4 and lR 2 LL(),
 if E = C a citizen of type R enters lobby lR if lL 2 LC().
Proof: We start from property 1). By assumption, the activity of a lobby does not depend on the
number of lobbyists in it. By entering an active lobby when T
j
P E = 0 a citizen reduces his payo
by an amount greater than or equal to the entry cost , depending on whether the lobby will be
included in the bargaining coalition. Therefore, the choice of entering is strictly dominated.
Consider now property 2). By entering, a citizen of type j would not aect the elected candidate's
policy choice and would not pay any transfers to the elected candidate. On the other hand, since
T
j
P E = 0 entering entails no transfers to the lobbyist and the payment of the entry cost . Therefore,
a citizen is strictly better o by not entering in this case.
Consider now property 3). Recall that from Proposition 1 above if LE() = fljg then `P E = fljg
and wj(xP E(`P E);j) = u(xP E(`P E);j)   u(zE;j). Therefore the payo to a type-j citizen if he
decides to enter the non-active lobby lj is:
u(xP E(`P E);j)      [u(xP E(`P E);j)   u(zE;j)] = u(zE;j)   : (A.6)
If instead the citizen does not enter his payo is
u(zE;j): (A.7)
Since  > 0 the payo in (A.7) dominates the payo in (A.6).Endogenous Lobbying 29
Consider now property 4). Given property 3) we can restrict attention to the case where LE()
contains two lobbies. We can distinguish three cases depending on the elected candidate E. Consider
rst the case in which E = L and a   a. A citizen of type C receives payo
u(0;C)    =  a2   ; (A.8)













if he does not enter lobby lC. For  small the payo in (A.9) is greater than or equal to the payo
in (A.8) if and only if a  1
4. Therefore a citizen of type C enters lobby lC if  a  a  1
4 and does
not enter this lobby if a  1
4. Consider now the entry decision of a citizen of type R. If he decides
to enter the lobby lR his payo is
u(0;R)    =  1   ; (A.10)












The payo in (A.11) clearly dominates the payo in (A.10). Consider now the case a   a. By
property 2) a citizen of type C does not enter lobby lC since lC 62 `P L. This implies that in
equilibrium it is not possible for both lobbies lC and lR to be active. Hence this case is irrelevant
since by property 3) the only relevant cases entail two active lobbies.
Consider now the case E = C. A citizen of type R receives payo
u(a;R)    =  (a   1)2   ; (A.12)












if he does not enter lobby lR. For  small the payo in (A.12) is greater than the payo in (A.13)
implying that the citizen of type R enters the lobby lR. Consider now the entry decision of a citizen
of type L. In this case `P C = flRg whether this citizen decides to enter the non active lobby lj or
not. Hence property 2) applies and a citizen of type L does not enter lobby lL.
The proof of the case E = R is similar to the proof of the previous cases and therefore isEndogenous Lobbying 30
omitted.
Lemma A.2. For any elected candidate PE, and any vector of entry choices  i, if T
j
P E =
u(xP E(`P E);j)   u(zE;j) the best reply of citizen i of type j 2 fL;C;Rg in the entry-of-lobbyists
subgame satises the following three properties:
10) A citizen of type j enters a lobby lj 62 `P E if and only if he expects m more citizens of type j to
enter the same lobby, for every m such that T
j
P E  (m + 1).
20) A citizen of type j never enters a lobby lj such that, if he decides not to enter, lj 2 `P E.
30) A citizen of type j always enters a lobby lj such that, if he decides not to enter, lj 62 LE() and
if he decides to enter, lj 2 `P E.
Proof: We start from property 10). By assumption, lj 62 `P E. Hence, no transfer is paid by lobby lj
to the elected candidate PE. Therefore the dierence in payos to a type-j citizen between entering




m+1    where m is the number of other type-j citizens who




m+1     0.
Consider now property 20). By assumption, the activity of a lobby does not depend on the
number of lobbyists in it. By entering a lobby lj such that lj 2 `P E a citizen i of type j reduces his
payo by the entry cost . This is because the share of subscriptions to lobby lj, T
j
P E, that citizen
i appropriates by becoming a lobbyist is exactly equal to his share of the payment lobby lj makes
to the elected candidate PE. Therefore, the choice of entering is strictly dominated.
Consider now property 30). Consider a citizen i of type j. For any  i such that lj 2 `P E if
i = 1, the payo to citizen i if he enters lj (i = 1) is equal to





Conversely, if citizen i does not enter (i = 0) then lj 62 LE() and his payo is equal to
u(xP E(^ `P E);j); (A.15)
where ^ `P E is the unique solution to problem (5) as characterized in Lemma 3 given  i and i = 0.
Notice that ^ `P E is either f;g or flkg, where k 6= j. Comparing (A.14) and (A.15), it is optimal for
citizen i to enter if and only if:




Nj : (A.16)Endogenous Lobbying 31
Condition (A.16) is always satised as long as the entry cost  is small and the number of type j
citizens is large. This is the case because from Lemma 2 u(xP E(`P E);j) > u(xP E(^ `P E);j).
Lemma A.3. For any elected candidate PE and any lobby lj the equilibrium of the subscription
game is such that:
If lj 62 `P E, j 2 fL;C;Rg, then T
j
P E = 0.
If E = L and  a  a  0:25, then TC
P L = 0 and TR
P L = u(xP L;R)   u(zL;R).
In every other case T
j
P E = u(xP E;j)   u(zE;j).
Proof: The subscription game we consider is a special case of the one analyzed in Bagnoli and
Lipman (1989). Their analysis guarantees that the unique undominated perfect equilibrium outcome
of our subscription game is such that each citizen is pivotal when making his decision whether to
pledge the amount t
j
P E, as in (6) above, to lobby lj. Hence whenever a citizen of type j benets
from having an active lobby of his type, and the lobby would not be active if T
j
P E = 0, then this
citizen will pledge the amount t
j
P E. Notice that this happens only if lj 2 `P E, unless j = C, E = L
and  a  a  0:25. For the details of the argument see Bagnoli and Lipman (1989).
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof follows from Lemma A.1, Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3.
Proof of Corollary 3: The proof follows from Lemma A.3.
Appendix B
In this appendix we present the characterization of the set of equilibria of the electoral competition
model described in Section 2 above when we remove the primaries from the extensive form. In
other words we allow multiple citizens of the same type to run for oce in the general election. For
simplicity, we restrict attention to the case where the number of citizens of each type is the same,
that is Nj = N=3 = n, j = L;C;R.
The characterization of the whole set of equilibria of the voting and entry of candidates subgames
diers considerably from the one presented in Section 3 above. We start from the voting subgame.
In the analysis of this subgame, following Besley and Coate (1997), we rule out weakly dominated
voting strategies.29
29See Besley and Coate (1997) for a denition of a weakly dominated voting strategy. Notice
that in our framework this restriction implies that when a citizen is not pivotal (he cannot aect
the outcome of the voting equilibrium by modifying his vote) he votes for the candidate that will
implement the policy choice closest to the citizen's most preferred outcome.Endogenous Lobbying 32
Let s denote the vector of citizens' decisions s
j
i whether to run for oce (in the framework
without primaries such a vector is the outcome of the entry of candidates subgame, instead of ).
Then the set of candidates is C(s).
We start considering the case in which a   a and C(s) includes only one candidate of type R,
eR. Then, independently of how many other candidates eh of type h 6= R are included in C(s),
candidate eR wins the election. Correspondingly, if a   a and C(s) includes only one candidate eL,
of type L then, independently of how many other candidates ek of type k 6= L are present in C(s),
candidate eL wins the election.
Proposition A.1. Let a   a. For any vector of candidate entry decisions s that induces a set of
candidates C(s) which contains only one eR candidate and any number of eh, h 6= R, candidates the
unique electoral outcome is that eR wins the election.
Alternatively, let a   a. For any vector of candidate entry decisions s that induces a set of
candidates C(s) which contains only one eL candidate and any number of ek, k 6= L, candidates the
unique electoral outcome is that eL wins the election.
Proof: Let a   a. The result follows from the observation that from the preference orderings in
(17) it is a weakly dominant strategy for the type L and C citizens to vote for candidate eR rather
than for any candidate eh, h 6= R. If instead a   a from the preference orderings in (18) it is a
weakly dominant strategy for the type L and C citizens to vote for candidate eL rather than for any
candidate ek, k 6= L.
Next, consider the case where all candidates in C(s) are of the same type. In this case, the
outcome of the voting game is indeterminate. In fact, in equilibrium, the electorate can allocate
votes among the candidates in any possible way. Notice that all the equilibria of this sort induce
the same payos to all citizens other than the candidates.
Finally, consider the case where the set of candidates C() contains two or more candidates of at
least two types. Let n(j) be the maximum number of citizens that vote for an individual candidate
ej of type j 2 fL;C;Rg.
Proposition A.2. There exist a vector of candidate entry decisions s that induces a set of candi-
dates C(s) which contains two or more candidates of at least two types and a vector of equilibrium
voting decisions v such that PE = ej for every j 2 fL;C;Rg.
Proof: We proceed by construction. Consider the case where a   a.Endogenous Lobbying 33
First, assume C() = feR;eR;eC;eCg. Then, from the preference orderings in (17) it follows that
it is a weakly dominant strategy for all citizens of types L and C to vote for one of the candidates eR
while it is a weakly dominant strategy for the type R citizens to vote for one of the eC candidates.
Further, the maximum number of citizens that will vote for one of the eR candidates cannot fall
below n: n(R)  n. If n(R) > n then necessarily PE = eR. Indeed, no more than n type R citizens
will vote for eC. Consider then the case n(R) = n. If n(C) < n then PE = eR. Therefore the only
case left to consider is the case n(R) = n and n(C) = n. In this case notice that each citizen of type
L and C is pivotal: by switching his vote from one of the eR candidates to the other a type L or
C citizen will increase to one the probability that an eR candidate wins the election increasing at
the same time his own payo. Therefore n(R) = n and n(C) = n cannot be an equilibrium of the
voting subgame.
Next, assume C() = feL;eL;eC;eCg. Then, from the preference orderings in (17) it is a weakly
dominant strategy for all citizens of types L and C to vote for one of the eL candidates, while it is
a weakly dominant strategy for the type R citizens to vote for one of the eC candidates. Then an
argument symmetric to the one we used for the case C() = feR;eR;eC;eCg above shows that in
every equilibrium of the voting subgame PE = eL.
Finally, assume C() = feR;eR;eR;eC;eCg and v is such that one third of the citizens of types L
and C vote for each candidate eR and all citizens of type R vote for one of the eC candidates. Hence,
each eR candidate receives 2n=3 votes and one of the candidates eC receives n(C)  n votes and is
therefore elected (that is, PE = eC). To show that this is an equilibrium of the voting subgame,
notice that no citizen can prot from a deviation since no voter is pivotal.
The proof for the case where a   a is analogous. Details are therefore omitted.
We can now move to the characterization of the equilibria of the entry of candidates subgame.
We rst prove that in the model without primaries a result analogous to Lemma 4 above holds.
Lemma A.4. All equilibria of the entry-of-candidates subgame are such that:
If a   a then eR 2 C(s).
If instead a   a then eL 2 C(s).
Proof: Consider the case where a   a. Assume by way of contradiction that eR 62 C(s). It follows
from the preference orderings in (17) that by entering, a citizen of type R would be elected for sure.
In this case, his payo would be equal to
(2   a)2
3
   (A.17)Endogenous Lobbying 34
which, for a small cost of entry , is positive. Notice that by not entering, the citizen's payo would
be negative regardless of the electoral outcome (see equations (16)). Thus, a citizen of type R would
enter. This is a contradiction of the assumption eR 62 C().
The proof in the case a   a is analogous and therefore omitted.
We can now show that only one type of candidate with extremist preferences may win the
elections in equilibrium. The type of this candidate will depend on the value of the parameter a.
Lemma A.5. There does not exist an equilibrium of the electoral competition game such that, if
a   a the elected candidate is eL, while if a   a the elected candidate is eR.
Proof: Let a   a. Assume by way of contradiction that such an equilibrium exists: PE = eL.
For this to be an equilibrium eL needs to collect the highest number of votes: n(L)  n(k), for
every ek 2 C(s), k 6= L. From Lemma A.4 above we have eR 2 C(s). Two alternatives are then
possible: either eC 2 C(s) or eC 62 C(s). Assume that eC 2 C(s). It is then a weakly dominant
strategy for the type R citizens to vote for candidate eC while it is a weakly dominant strategy for
type L and C citizens to vote for candidate eR. This implies that no citizen will vote for candidate
eL contradicting the hypothesis that eL wins the election: n(L) > n(k) for k = C;R. Consider now









Consider now a deviation from this equilibrium in which a type C citizen decides to enter the
electoral competition as candidate ^ eC. Then it is a weakly dominant strategy for type R citizens to
vote for candidate eC while it is a weakly dominant strategy for type L and C citizens to vote for
eR: n(L) = 0. Therefore only two possible equilibria of the voting game can arise: candidate ^ eC




(1   2a)2  








Notice that for a high n and a small  both payos in (A.19) and (A.20) are strictly higher than
the equilibrium payo in (A.18). Hence entering the electoral competition is a protable deviation
for candidate ^ eC contradicting the hypothesis that there exist an equilibrium in which eL wins and
eC 62 C(s).Endogenous Lobbying 35
The proof in the case a   a is analogous and therefore omitted.
Finally we show that when multiple candidates of a given type enter the electoral competition
and win the election they must have equal probability of being elected. Let mj denotes the number
of ej candidates in C(s).
Lemma A.6. All equilibria of the model without primaries are such that:
If a   a and a candidate eR wins the election, then n(R) = 2n=mR. If instead a candidate eC wins
the election then n(C) = n=mC.
If instead a   a and a candidate eL wins the election then n(L) = 2n=mL. If instead a candidate
eC wins the election then n(C) = n=mC.30
Proof: Let a   a and consider the case in which candidate eR wins the election. Assume by way
of contradiction that n(R) > 2n=mR. Then there exists a candidate  eR 2 C(s) that will loose the




(2   a)2   : (A.21)
Consider now a deviation in which candidate  eR decides not to enter the electoral competition. From
Proposition A.2 above three equilibria of the voting game can occur: either an other eR candidate
wins the election or one of the eC and eL candidates wins the election. In the case an other eR




(2   a)2: (A.22)




(1   a)2  













For a high n the payos in (A.22), (A.23) and (A.24) are strictly higher than the payo in (A.21).
This contradicts the hypothesis that there exist an equilibrium in which eR wins the election and
n(R) > 2n=mR.
30The lemma is stated in the case in which more than one type of candidates is in C(s). If only
one type of candidates, say eR, is in C(s) then n(R) = N(R)=mR, where N(R) denotes the total
number of citizens that cast their vote.Endogenous Lobbying 36
The proof in the case that eC wins the election and in the case a   a is analogous and hence
omitted.
We have now all the elements to characterize the set of equilibria of the model without primaries.
We start by classifying these equilibria on the basis of the type of the elected candidate. In particular
we can distinguish two types of equilibria that we label the `extremist' equilibria and the `centrist'
equilibria, respectively.
If a   a, the extremist equilibria are all such that candidate eR is elected, while if a   a these












We rst provide a characterization of both types of equilibria and then prove that only these
two types of equilibria exist. We start from the extremist equilibria.
Proposition A.3. There exist two types of extremist equilibria: Equilibria with only one type of
candidates and equilibria with multiple types of candidates. All extremist equilibria are such that
the policy choice implemented is x, as in (A.25).
The extremist equilibria with only one type of candidates are such that:
If a   a then C(s) contains mR candidates eR, such that mR = 1;:::;  nR
 , where  nR
 is dened in
(22) above.
If instead a   a then C(s) contains mL candidates eL, such that mL = 1;:::;  nL
 , where  nL
 is
dened in (23) above.
The extremist equilibria with multiple types of candidates are such that:
If a   a then C(s) contains mR candidates eR, such that mR = 3;:::;  nR
 and mh, h 6= R, candidates
such that 2mh > mR.
If instead a   a then C(s) contains mL candidates eL, such that mL = 1;:::;  nL
 and mk, k 6= L,
candidates such that 2mk > mL.Endogenous Lobbying 37
Proof: We start from the extremist equilibria with only one type of candidates. Let a   a. From
Lemma A.6 the polity will split its votes equally among the mR candidates.




















From denition (22), if mR   nR
 and  is small then the payo in (A.27) is greater or equal to the
payo in (A.28). In other words, candidate eR has no incentive to deviate.
Consider now a type h 6= R citizen and assume that he deviates and decides to enter the electoral
competition as candidate: eh 2 C(s). It is an equilibrium of the voting subgame for type L and C
citizens to vote for one and only one of the eR candidates. This implies that this eR candidate wins
the election. Therefore using, o the equilibrium path, this equilibrium of the voting subgame in
which eh 2 C(s) and eR wins, it is possible to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire
game such that by entering candidate eh does not change the policy but reduces his payo of the
entry cost . Hence eh is strictly better o by not entering the electoral competition and has no
incentive to deviate.
Finally, consider a type R citizen, dierent from each of the mR candidates eR, and assume
that he deviates and decides to enter the electoral competition as candidate ^ eR 2 C(s). The set
of candidate C(s) then contains (mR + 1) type R candidates. It is an equilibrium of the voting
subgame for the polity to vote for only one of the original eR candidates. This implies that this
eR candidate wins the election. Therefore using, o the equilibrium path, this equilibrium of the
voting subgame in which ^ eR 2 C(s) and one of the eR candidates wins, it is possible to construct a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game such that by entering candidate ^ eR does not change
the policy outcome but reduces his payo of the entry cost . Hence ^ eR is strictly better o by
not entering the electoral competition and has no incentive to deviate. Therefore no citizens has an
incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies.
The proof in the case a   a is analogous and therefore omitted.
Consider now the extremist equilibria with multiple types of candidates. Let a   a. Notice
rst that since by Lemma A.6 n(R) = 2n=mR and by denition n(h)  n=mh then provided that
2mh  mR or (2n=mR)  (n=mh) it is an equilibrium of the voting game for the type L and C
citizens to split equally their votes among the mR candidates and n(R) = (2n=mR) > n(h) so that
one of the eR candidates wins the elections.Endogenous Lobbying 38
Consider now one of the mR candidates ^ eR. In equilibrium the expected payo to ^ eR is the
same as in (A.27). Further, it is an equilibrium of the voting subgame for all the type L and C
citizens to vote for the same candidate eR 2 C(s). Therefore using, o-the-equilibrium-path, this
equilibrium of the voting subgame it is possible to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
entire game such that if candidate ^ eR decides to deviate and not to enter the electoral competition
an other eR candidate will win the election. In this case the payo to ^ eR is the same as in (A.28).
From denition (22), if mR   nR
 and  is small the payo in (A.27) strictly dominates the payo
in (A.28). Therefore candidate ^ eR has no incentive to deviate.













(1   2a)2  




if h = C. Further, since mR > 2 or n > (2n=mR) it is an equilibrium of the voting game for all the
type R citizens to vote for only one of the eh candidates and for this candidate to win the elections:
n(R) < n(h). Therefore using, o-the-equilibrium-path, this equilibrium of the voting subgame it
is possible to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game such that if candidate ^ eh
decides to deviate and not to enter the electoral competition an other eh candidate will win the
election. In this case the payo to ^ eh if a candidate eL wins is  1






















(1   2a)2; (A.33)
if h = C. Notice that if h = L for a high n and a small  the payo in (A.29) strictly dominates
both the payo  1
4 and the payo in (A.32); while if h = C the payo in (A.30) strictly dominates
both payos in (A.31) and (A.33). Therefore candidate ^ eh has no incentive to deviate.
Finally, consider a type j 2 fL;C;Rg citizen dierent from the mR and mh candidates in C(s)
and assume that this citizen decides to enter the electoral competition as an additional candidate
 ej 2 C(s). It is an equilibrium of the voting subgame for type L and C citizens to vote for only one
of the original eR candidates so as to win the election. This implies that the  ej candidate will notEndogenous Lobbying 39
win the election. Therefore using, o-the-equilibrium-path, this equilibrium of the voting subgame
it is possible to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game such that, by entering,
candidate  ej does not win the election and does not change the policy choice but only reduces his
payo of the entry cost . Hence  ej is strictly better o by not entering the electoral competition
and has no incentive to deviate.
The proof in the case a   a is analogous and therefore omitted.
We can now move to the characterization of the centrist equilibria. Let  nC







Notice that for a small  we get  nC
 > 1.
Proposition A.4. All centrist equilibria are such that each candidate eC is elected with equal
probability (1=mC) and implements policy x as in (A.26). These equilibria are such that:
If a   a, then C(s) contains mC = 1;:::;  nC
 candidates eC and mR  2mC + 1 candidates eR.
Type R citizens split equally their votes among the eC candidates, while type L and C citizens splits




If instead a   a, then C(s) contains mC = 1;:::;  nC
 candidates eC and mL  2mC + 1 candidates
eL. Type R citizens split equally their votes among the eC candidates, while type L and C citizens




Proof: Let a   a. Notice rst that given condition (A.35) and Lemma A.6 above it is an equilib-
rium of the voting subgame for n(C) = (n=mC) and n(R) < n(C).
Consider now one of the mR candidates in C(s): ~ eR. Given condition (A.35), in equilibrium this




(1   a)2  
(1   a)2   1
4(1   a)2
n
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Assume, instead, that this candidate decides to deviate and does not enter the electoral competition.
It is an equilibrium of the voting subgame for type L and C citizens to vote for one and only one of




(2   a)2: (A.38)
For n large and  small the payo in (A.37) strictly dominates the payo in (A.38) implying that
candidate ~ eR is better o by entering the electoral competition and therefore does not want to
deviate.
Consider now one of the eC candidates in C(s). By entering the electoral competition this




















From denition (A.34), if mC   nC
 and  is small then the payo in (A.39) strictly dominates the
payo in (A.40). In other words, candidate eC has no incentive to deviate.
Finally, consider a type j 2 fL;C;Rg citizen dierent from the mR and mC candidates in C(s)
and assume that this citizen decides to enter the electoral competition as an additional candidate
 ej 2 C(s). It is an equilibrium of the voting subgame for type L and C citizens to split their votes
among the eR candidates so as to satisfy condition (A.35), and for type R citizens to vote for only
one of the original eC candidates so that this candidate eC wins. This implies that the  ej candidate
will not win the election. Therefore using, o-the-equilibrium-path, this equilibrium of the voting
subgame it is possible to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game such that, by
entering, candidate  ej does not win the election and does not change the policy choice but only
reduces his payo of the entry cost . Hence  ej is strictly better o by not entering the electoral
competition and has no incentive to deviate.
The proof in the case a   a is analogous and therefore omitted.
A key feature of both these types of equilibria is that they are based on the fact that the citizens
of each type can split their votes among identical candidates in any possible way provided that none
of the voters is pivotal. We view this feature as pathological. As discussed in Section 2.1 above,
it exclusively relies on the assumption that perfectly identical candidates may enter the electoral
competition. This is the reason why we introduce primaries in the extensive form of the model.Endogenous Lobbying 41
We can now show that no other type of equilibria exist in the model with no primaries.
Proposition A.5. The only two types of equilibria of the electoral competition model without
primaries are extremist and centrist equilibria as dened in Propositions A.3 and A.4 above.
Proof: Let a   a. From Lemma A.4 we have eR 2 C(s). Further, from Lemma A.5 we have that
there do not exist equilibria of the model without primaries such that a candidate eL wins. There
exist therefore only equilibria where a candidate eR or a candidate eC wins. Our proof is therefore
complete if we show that there do not exist equilibria where a candidate eR wins that dier from the
extremist equilibria characterized in Proposition A.3 above; and there do not exist equilibria where
a candidate eC wins that dier from the centrist equilibria characterized in Proposition A.4 above.
We proceed in three steps.
Step 1. There do not exist extremist equilibria with mh  1, h 6= R, candidates eh 2 C(s) and
2mh  mR.
Assume, by way of contradiction that these equilibria exist. From Lemma A.6 above we have that
n(R) = (2n=mR). Moreover by denition of n(h) we have n(h)  (n=mh) while by assumption






For these extremist equilibria to exist we need n(R)  n(h). Clearly this condition contradicts
n(R) < n(h), therefore the only alternative left is n(R) = n(h). Notice however that in the case
n(R) = n(h) each type L and C citizen is pivotal since by switching his vote from one of the eR
candidate to an other each citizen can guarantee that an eR candidate is elected with probability one
improving in this way his payo (as from the preferences in (17)). Therefore it is not an equilibrium
of the voting subgame for n(h) = n(R) = (2n=mR).
Step 2. There do not exist centrist equilibria with mL  1 candidates eL 2 C(s).
Assume by way of contradiction that these equilibria exist. From Lemma A.5 we know that none of
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Assume now that one of the type L candidates ~ eL does not enter the electoral competition. Since,
from Proposition A.4, there are mR candidates eR in C(s) and mC candidates eC in C(s) it is a
weakly dominant strategy for the type L and C citizens to vote for an eR candidate and for the type
R citizens to vote for an eC candidates. Therefore only two outcomes of the voting subgame are



















Both payos in (A.42) and in (A.43) strictly dominates the payo in (A.41). Implying that it is a
protable deviation for a candidate ~ eL not to enter the electoral competition.
Step 3. There do not exist centrist equilibria with mR candidates eR and mC candidates eC in
C(s) such that mR  2mC.
Assume, by way of contradiction that these equilibria exist. From Lemma A.6 above we have that
n(C) = (n=mC). Moreover by denition of n(R) we have n(R)  (2n=mR) while by assumption






For these centrist equilibria to exist from Proposition A.4 we need n(C)  n(R). Clearly this
condition contradicts n(C) < n(R), therefore the only alternative left is n(C) = n(R). The same
argument presented in the proof of Step 1 above implies that there does not exist an equilibrium of
the voting subgame such that n(C) = n(R).
The proof in the case a   a is analogous and therefore omitted.
We conclude the appendix by observing that all one, two and three candidates equilibria of the
model without primaries are extremist equilibria with only one type of candidates. In other words
all the pathological equilibria of the model without primaries require at least four candidates in C(s).
Corollary A.1. All one, two and three candidates equilibria of the model without primaries are
such that if a   a then only eR candidates are in C(s) while if a   a then only eL candidates are in
C(s).
Proof: The proof follows from Propositions A.3, A.4 and A.5 above.Endogenous Lobbying 43
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